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 1. Introduction 
 
This paper is dedicated to the problem of patients’ rights. It will discuss this problem in a 
special historical context: that of post-communist Hungary. Let me begin by saying a word or 
two on what makes this context so special from the point of view of our topic.  
 
Around 1989-90, Hungary went through a process of transition from communism to 
democracy. At the same time, it left the sphere of interest of the collapsing Soviet Union, and 
joined the Euro-Atlantic community of democratic states. The transformation of the internal 
political system of the country and the change of its geopolitical situation gave strong impetus 
to a tendency towards an internalization of the internationally recognized principles and rules 
of human rights and of the applications of these, including the rights possessed by patients 
subjected to medical treatment. In a very short period of time, the legal system of the country 
was subjected to a thoroughgoing review; legal provisions in conflict with patients’ rights 
have been annuled or amended, and the international codes of patients’ rights have been 
translated into internal law. Although the Hungarian law continues to be deficient in many 
ways from this point of view, its written provisions concerning patients’ rights are comparable 
to those of any legal system with long democratic traditions. However, if we shift the focus of 
interest from the written law to the living practice through which the law is interpreted and 
applied to particular cases, we have to see that there is a huge gap between law and legal 
practice. The paper will describe the facts of the gap, and it will explain them by the 
paternalistic culture inherited from the previous regime that survived the collapse of 
communism. 
 
Let me try to illuminate the above claims by a number of examples. Here are a number of 
recent news, to begin with: 
 
• In November 2005, the second stem cell bank was opened in Hungary. It offers the 
possibility to parents of newborn babies to preserve in a frozen state stem cells won 
from the blood in the umbilical cord. 
• In May 2004, the National Health Insurance (NHI) announced a competition for 
funding hospice services. 
• In its communications campaign conducted in August 2005, the government asked the 
question to citizens, whether they find it proper for prospective parents to have the 
right to choose the gender of their future child.  
• In a ruling as of November 14, 2005, the Constitutional Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a legal provision that made the access to artificial sterilization 
conditional on various specific facts such as the number of children the person already 
has. The Court declared that such provisions amount to an unjustifiable invasion of a 
citizen’s self-determination (a term that, in Hungarian constitutional law, fills roughly 
the same place as ’privacy’ in the constitutional law of the US). 
 
Compare now these news with the following research results  from rougly the same 
period.  
 
• Between 2002 and 2004, three independent inquiries have been conducted on the 
state of patients’ rights in Hungary: one initiated by the Parliamentary 
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Commissioner of Civil Rights1, a second by the Public Foundation of Patients 
Rights Representatives2, and a third one by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union3, a 
human rights group whose activities are focusing, among other things, on the issue 
of the rights of human persons in their role as medical patients. The reports of 
these inquiries invariably claim that  
• in the course of the medical treatment, the right to human dignity of the people 
subjected to medical treatment is very often violated, the patient is treated as an 
object of medical intervention rather than as a subject who has the right to take the 
final decision about his/her treatment, and whose voluntary cooperation rather than 
passive resilience is to be sought, 
• the most routine violation consisting in the withdrawal of information. 
 
The news listed above and the reports cited next to them seem to be in conflict. The news 
suggest an image of Hungary as a country where the opportunities for the citizens to take 
autonomous decisions with regard to medical techniques and practices are as open as they are 
in any other member state of the European Union. The public discussion on these 
opportunities seems to be focusing on the same subjects it does in the older democracies, the 
positions and the arguments marshalled on both sides seem to be the same as they are there. 
The question is, what kind of institutional rules could help to make available the new 
procedures invented as a result of the immense progress in the biosciences so that the patients 
have as great as possible autonomy in making use of them, while the potential dangers remain 
under control. 
 
But if we address the research reports, the picture becomes less bright. Hungary will not 
appear any more as a country on a par with, say, Austria or the Federal Republic of Germany, 
but as one where the most elementary conditions of personal autonomy in the domain of 
health care may still be unavailable. 
 
When, in the above paragraphs, I have spoken about a gap between law and legal practice, I 
had such tensions between news and research results in mind. This paper will make an 
attempt at understanding this gap, this tension. It will try to describe the way the conflicting 
facts fit together in a historic pattern in a country that recently emerged from the communist 
past to embrace constitutional democracy and to join the international community of 
democratic states. It will try to explain the facts of the conflict, to evaluate the situation where 
Hungary now is with regard to the rights of the patient and, in particular, the right to informed 
consent. Finally, it will make some modest policy proposals on how to engage in overcoming 
the present, conflict-ridden situation.   
 
In what follows, I will proceed in the following manner. First, I will spell out the hypothesis 
of this paper in a somewhat greater detail (Section 2). Then, I will address more closely the 
paternalist heritage of the communist past which plays a key role in explaining the gap 
between post-communist law and post-communist legal practice (Section 3). Next, I will offer 
a short overview of how the idea of patients’ rights emerged and rose to the status of an 
                                                 
1 Annual Report on the Activities of the Parliamentary Commissioner of Civil Rights and his General Deputy in 
2003, Edited by the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner of Civil Rights in May 2004. 
2 Case Studies on the Rights of Patients, Children and People Cared in Nursing Homes, compiled by the Public 
Foundation on the Rights of Children, Patients and People in Nursing Homes.January 2005. See: 
www.jogvedok.hu 
3 Orsolya Heuer, ed: Patient Rights in Hungary- Rules and Practice. Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Budapest 
2002. p 27. 
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official doctrine in the democratic West (Section 4). After this, I turn to the special conditions 
of the democratic transition and to how these conditions explain the legislative revolution in 
the field of human rights in general and patients’ rights in particular (Section 5). This account 
will be followed by an in-depth analysis of the Health Act of 1997 (Sections 6 and 7). 
Sections 8 to 10 will be dedicated to the specific problem areas of legal competence in the 
context of health care decisions, of refusing life-sustaining treatment, and of informed 
consent. In the light of all this, Section 11 will suggest a number of modest policy proposals. 
 
 
 
2. More on the hypothesis of this paper 
 
In the preceding section, I suggested that we make a distinction between legislation and legal 
practice. Legislation is the easiest to adapt to norms and principles that are alien to past 
institutional practices. The resistance exerted by the old habits and attitudes is strongest at the 
level of legal practice. Some factors that are favorable to human rights are temporary and 
weakening over time. The prestige of the Democratic Opposition and of the liberal ideas it 
represented was at its zenith at the beginning of the transition process, and gradually faded 
away during the following decade. The Constitutional Court was more determined about 
defending human rights in the first years of its existence than it was from the second half of 
the 1990s on. Thus, the first years of the new regime were exceptionally favorable for legal 
reform. But legal practice needed more time in order to adapt to the changes in legislation, 
and the years following the mid-nineties were less and less propitious for this process. Of 
course, the new legislation did not completely remain without practical effects: hence the 
facts cited in the beginning. Nevertheless, the gap between the law and the legal practice is 
enormous. 
 
To put it differently: legislative steps need to be combined with favorable institutional and 
social practices in order to reach their aim. Such practices are not automatically triggered by 
new legislation. They are to be created through collective effort, and this task raises special 
problems for the post-communist countries. This is because the dominant patterns of behavior 
are shaped by the paternalist heritage, and because, not unrelated to the survival of 
paternalistic attitudes, civil society input into policy decisions remains very weak. 
 
 
 
3. The paternalist heritage of the communist past 
 
The communist regimes made great efforts to make health care universally available. To some 
degree, these efforts were successful. Nobody was denied the access to basic medical 
provision on the ground that he/she was not able to pay for it. However, universal provision of 
health care was not accompanied by a universally high level of medical assistance. Like any 
other types of services, medical services were marked by chronic shortages that, on their part, 
induced a practice of corruption labeled by the euphemistic term ’parasolvence’. Thus, 
notwithstanding of the notional availablility of universal free health care, the average life 
expectancy at birth  of men began to decline. 4 In 1990, according to the Hungarian Central 
                                                 
4 The average life expectancy at birth of men was 66,3 years in 1970, 65,45 in 1980, and 65,13 in 1990. In other 
words, between 1970 and 1990 the average life expectancy of men decreased by somewhat more than one year. 
After the regime change, between 1990 and 2000, it increased 3 years + in 2001, it was 68,1 years. See STADAT 
– 1.1.1. Népesség, népmozgalom. (Population and its Changes.), www.ksh.hu 
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Statistical Office, the average life expectancy at birth was, for men, 68,4 years in Bulgaria, 
67,6 in the Czech Republic, 64,6 in Estonia, 65,1 in Hungary, 64,2 in Latvia, 66,6 in 
Lithuania, 66,5 in Poland, 66,6 in Rumania, 66,6 in Slovakia, and 69,4 in Slovenia, as against 
the average of 72,8 in the 15 member states of the European Communities. In the same year, 
the average life expectancy at birth was, for women, 75,2 years in Bulgaria, 75,4 in the Czech 
Republic, 74,6 in Estonia, 73,7 in Hungary, 74,6 in Latvia, 76,2 in Lithuania, 75,5 in Poland, 
73,1 in Rumania, 75,4 in Slovakia, and 77,2 in Slovenia as against the European Communities 
average of 79,4.5 
 
These negative characteristics of the Soviet type health care system were not unrelated to the 
regime’s authoritarian character. The party-state utterly disregarded the value of personal 
autonomy, and nurtured a culture of collectivistic interference with personal decision-making. 
This tendency to interfere with self-regarding individual decisions is called „collectivism” 
when the acts of intervention are justified by reference to the public good. It is called 
„paternalism” when the self-regarding decisions of an individual are interfered with on the 
ground of a claim that the community or its political embodiment, the state, knows better what 
is good for the individual than that individual himself or herself. Thus, one of the main aims 
of the legal and institutional reforms in new democracies must be that of transforming the 
citizen-state relationship into one between an autonomous person and an institution that is 
expected to respect personal autonomy and that sees itself not as designed to dominate the 
individual but to assist her or him in taking informed decisions and in carrying them out. The 
inherited culture of collectivism and paternalism resists this transformation, and it is is more 
likely to resist it in certain domains than in others.  
 
Paternalism was built into the hierarchical and authoritarian organization of communist 
societies. Wages and salaries did not reflect the contribution of the people to the national 
product: income earners received only a relatively small part of the value produced by them in 
form of disposable income; many of their needs have not been covered by their own consumer 
decision but in the form of government provided collective services. This system generated 
attitudes of dependence in ordinary people and surrounded the state with an aura of a parental 
care-taker.  
 
The same paternalism that pervaded all the provinces of life dominated the physician-patient 
relationship, too. The patient was educated to see himself/herself as dependent on the 
physician who has exclusive knowledge of what state he/she should be in and what treatment 
he/she should need. The asymmetry of their relationship was sanctified by the trust the patient 
was suppose blindly to invest in the physician. Trust in the physician as a superior authority 
was supposed to give the relationship a sort of exalted character. 
 
Paternalism rings nicely as a term: it tends to elicit associations of a warm, caring 
relationship. Actually, this expression covers practices which are more often than not cool and 
ruthless. Consider the practice of involuntary commitment of psychiatric patients. It would be 
wrong to claim that involuntary commitment is never, under any possible conditions, 
permissible as a measure. But even if it may be justified under certain very special conditions, 
it still remains a most painful interference with the personal right to self-determination and, 
therefore, it cannot be allowed except in exceptional and strictly delimited cases. These are 
cases where the patient’s state gives rise to a well-founded judgment that he or she represents 
an imminent danger for his/her own life and bodily integrity or for the life and bodily integrity 
                                                 
5 See STADAT – 4.1.6. Születéskor várható élettartam (Life expectancy at birth), www.ksh.hu 
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of someone else. Therefore, the procedure of involuntary commitment must be subject to very 
stringent rules, much more stringent than those that are to be followed in the case of other, 
less extreme interventions. No such rules have been legislated under the communist regime in 
Hungary, and the reckless disregard of the special plight of those committed to a psychiatric 
ward against their will gave opportunity to a wide range of abuses.6 Some of these have been 
politically motivated,7 but the overwhelming majority of such procedures have been initiated 
by relatives, neighbors or acquaintances of the unfortunate person who was perceived by them 
as a nuisance.8 
 
Although Hungary knew two great cycles of economic reforms (in the late 1960s and, then, in 
the mid-1980s), the Soviet type system of health care provision was left unaffected by both of 
these. The state remained the only health care provider, the health care institutions remained 
subjected to a rigidly centralized hierarchy, and health care decisions remained under the 
exclusive control of the medical profession and the central agencies rather than being shared 
with the patients. The latter did not have the opportunity to choose either the physician or the 
medical institution of their preference. Hospitals and outpatient clinics were assigned to 
geographic districts and nobody had the right to seek treatment in a medical institution 
beyond the district where he or she lived (the only exception being the university clinics 
which had the whole country as their „district”). Not even within their „district” had they a 
choice between the General Practitioners working their: each patient has been officially 
assigned to one and only one G.P. 
 
Health care is a domain with a strong internal motivation to adapt itself to the paternalistic 
and collectivistic patterns of thinking characteristic of communist regimes. The medical 
profession has vested interests in maintaining the hierarchical structure of health provision 
where the providing units are directly subordinated to the state and receive their funding from 
central sources. This is partly explained by the medical profession’s tradition to be, itself, 
organized in a hierarchical manner, whatever the wider institutional framework of society. 
Physicians have to join a semi-public medical chamber; hospitals and clinics work under a 
strictly hierarchical regime of professors, adjunct professors and assistant professors where 
the full professor is in all respects the superior of the rest. Another source of the conservatism 
of the medical profession is the physicians’ traditional status of authority in society: the 
strictly hierarchical organization of the health care institutions supports this status while 
decentralization and competition threaten with transforming it into that of a mere service 
provider. Finally, once corruption became endemic, it also contributes to the medical 
profession’s sticking to the system that produces and goes on to reproduce it. 
                                                 
6 The Health Act of 1972 provided for a periodic review of the cases of those involuntarily committed. The 
committee consisted of physicians. It was supposed to work in the presence of a judge, but the latter had no say 
as to the merit of the case: his or her role was reduced to bearing witness to the legality of the procedure.  
7 The phenomenon called „political psychiatry” that was so widely used in the Soviet Union, was not unknown 
in communist Hungary. See the description of the 1981 incident of Károly Jakab, who was an activist of the 
National Peasant Party between 1945 and ’48 (Beszélő, an underground political magazine, No 1, 1981 and No  7, 
1983), and the 1982 story of Tibor Pákh, a political prisoner between 1957 and 1970, (Beszélő No 2, 1982). 
8 In 1991, a legal committee organized within the Hungarian Association of Social Psychiatrists filed a petition 
with the Ministry of Justice asking for a review of the situation in the light of the precedents of the Strasbourg 
Court. The same document included a model law on the institutional care provided to the people psychiatric 
illnesses. See „Javaslat a pszichiátriai betegek intézeti (intramurális) gyógykezelésének jogi szabályozására” 
(Proposal for a Legal Regulation of the Institutional [intramural] Care of Psychiatric Patients), in: Psychiatria 
Hungarica, December 1991, pp. 403-418. It took three more years until it came to a revision of the rules of  
involuntary commitment. This happened on February 15, 1995, when the Parliament passed an amendment of 
the 1972 Health Act that made the involuntary commitment of a patient dependent on a judicial decision to be 
made upon a hearing having been given to the patient. 
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This is the background against which we have to understand the changes induced by the 
collapse of the communist regime and the transition to constitutional democracy. 
 
Under communism, no voluntary associations could be legally formed with the aim to 
monitor the activities of the party-state and its institutions, to form alternative policy 
conceptions and to exercize pressure on the power-holder in the interest of promoting change. 
The only independent organizations that were able to take roots were dissident human rights 
groups such as the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Polish Workers’ Defense Committee 
established in 1976, Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia, and the Democratic Opposition in Hungary. 
As a result, there was no single organization specialized in patients’ rights at the time when 
the transition to democracy was completed. 
 
 
4. A quick view on the rise of the patients’ rights doctrine 
 
The movement for the rights of the human person in his/her role as a patient had various 
different historical sources. In the United States, it took inspiration from the growing 
sensitivity to human rights, a significant result of the civil rights movement of the ’60s, and 
from a radically critical attitude towards consumerism encouraged by the counter-culture 
movement of the New Left. In Europe, the New Left of the 1960s and the Green movements 
that made their appearance in the 1970s served as sources of general ideas that could, then, be 
applied to the domain of health care. (Consider, e.g., the Foucaultian description of the 
institution of psychiatric asylums and of hospitals in general as vehicles of domination and 
oppression.) By the 1970s, human rights activism expanded it horizons to the case of 
individuals subjected coercive measures in the course or on the pretext of their treatment. 
 
The new awareness of the lack of autonomy in the context of medical treatment had yet 
another source. Since the 1960s on, the general public became more and more aware of the 
fact that as consumers, people are seriously underinformed relative to the providers of the 
goods and services they buy and, that, this informational asymmetry makes them fatally 
dependent on the providers. One after the other, consumer protection groups have been 
established to provide information and to engage in litigation against firms for false 
advertisement and secrecy about the harmful side-effects of their products. All this 
contributed to raise the level of sensitivity for information and informed decision-making. 
 
It is not my aim to describe here the history of the rise of the sensitivity for patients’ rights in 
the US and in Western Europe. Suffice it to state that by the 1990, this process reached the 
level of governments. In 1994, the so-called Amsterdam Declaration has been adopted by 
representatives of 36 European states.9  
 
Before it came to this official event, one comparative study has been conducted by Professor 
Henk Leenen and his associates, between 1988 and ’89 on legal rules affecting the state of 
patients’ rights in 27 countries of Europe. The summary report based on the research data 
offered a general overview of the available legal solutions to secure autonomous decision-
making in the context of health care provision. It offered a picture of improving preparedness 
by the governments to recognize and protect the right of the patient to informed consent. As a 
particularly good example of this, many countries took steps to uphold the right of the 
                                                 
9 A Declaration on the Promotion of Patients Rights in Europe, endorsed at the European Consultation of WHO, 
held on March 28-30, 1994. 
 6
terminally ill to human dignity, even though the right even to refuse life-sustaining treatment 
was not generally acknowledged yet, as it is now in the majority of European countries. Also, 
the awareness that the will of the incompetent patient or her/his advance directive must be 
given a fair hearing made its appearance in the examined legal documents.10 
 
The Amsterdam Declaration which counts as a European Charter of Patients’ Rights took as 
its starting point the report and the recommendations of the Leeden Study. The legal solutions 
sumarized and advocated by this study had for their background the principle that patients 
have a right that the treatment which they are subjected to be based on their informed and 
uncoerced consent. This principle and some others closely related to it have been developed  
into a coherent document by the Amsterdam Declaration. 
 
Three years later, the Council of Europe officially adopted a convention on the application of 
biology and medicine.11 Unlike the Amsterdam Declaration, the Convention is a piece of 
international law that has binding force for the states that signed and ratified it. 
 
To conclude this very short overview, I have to mention the role of the European Court of 
Human Rights (the so-called Strasbourg Court) in the development of the conceptual 
apparatus of patients’ rights and in the rise of the sensitivity for them. Since its creation in 
1959 with an initially limited authority and, then, its elevation to its present status in 1998, the 
Strasbourg Court heard a large number of cases concerning patients’ rights, especially in the 
field of the deprivation of liberty to which psychiatric patients may be subjected. As we will 
see, the Court’s rulings had a serious impact on the legislative and other efforts in Hungary to 
bring the country’s law and legal practice in line with European standards. 
 
 
5. The transition to democracy 
 
In 1989, the communist regime collapsed in Hungary, and a negotiated transition to 
democracy took place. The transition was presided by the principles of the rule of law and of 
human rights. It was not restricted to the introduction of a multi-party system and of a practice 
of free elections. Its dominant ideology was that of constitutionalism. 
 
After decades of arbitrary rule, the politically active part of the citizenry was adamant about 
having a regime based on the rule of the law. After decades of deprivation of freedoms, basic 
rights suddenly found themselves at the top of peoples’ values. After decades where the 
constitution was nothing more than a piece of paper without legal force, a strong consensus 
emerged that the constitution must be enforced both against the executive and the legislative 
power. 
 
Because the Democratic Opposition, a human rights-based political movement, emerged as 
the most vocal adversary of the communist regime for more than a decade, human rights 
began to enjoy, at least in the years of the transition, a prestige beyond challenge. 
 
                                                 
10 Promotion of the Rights of Patients in Europe, A Comparative Study. Henk Leenen, Sjef Gevers and 
Geneviève Pinet, eds. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993. 
11 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to Application of 
Biology and Medicine. Council of Europe. Oviedo, April 4, 1997. Incorporated into the Hungarian legal system 
by the Act VI of 2002.  
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The national roundtable agreement provided for the establishment of a strong Constitutional 
Court with wide powers of striking down legislation and governmental decrees, and the Court 
engaged in project of actively raising the level of protection human rights enjoyed in virtue of 
legislation. It abolished capital punishment as incompatible with the constitutional right to life 
and to human dignity in 1990, and laid down the principles for the protection of personal data, 
an important privacy right in 1991, for example. 
 
All these factors contributed to create a climate, in the first post-communist years, which was 
extremely favorable for progressive efforts in the domain of health care related rights, too. 
But this is only one part of the story. The external context provided strong stimuli in the same 
direction. 
 
The transitions of 1989-90 were not restricted to changes internal to the post-communist 
countries. The collapse of the Soviet-type regimes proceeded on a par with the collapse of the 
Soviet empire. The Warsaw Pact and Comecon have been dissolved, the Soviet army 
withdrew from the countries of Eastern Europe it occupied for almost half of a century. These 
countries found themselves in a new geopolitical situation. The disappearance of the Soviet 
Union left these countries with no other alternative but to join the international organizations 
of the democratic West. NATO and the European Union are the most prominent among these, 
but there are many more. Human rights principles, including those applied to medical 
practice, are part and parcel of these institutional structures. Therefore, in order to become 
fully recognized members of the organizations in question, the new democracies must comply 
with these principles.  
 
In the domain of health care, the situation is very special. In the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, life expectancy of the adult population do not 
improve as compared to Western Europe. The average male life expectancy in Hungary rose 
between 1970 and 1990 with two years, the average life expectancy of women  rose 
somewhat more than four years, while the rise in the 15 countries belonging to the EU before 
2004 surpassed seven years in the same period.12 Thus, although the decade following the 
transition to democracy was marked by some improvement in our region, the same period was 
characterized by rising standards in the old member states of the EU as well, so the relative 
position of the post-communist countries did not change significantly. 
 
The position of Hungary seems to be particularly weak. In 2002, in terms of the male life 
expectancy only the Baltic states and Rumania were lagging behind it, in terms of the female 
life expectancy, only Bulgaria and Rumania were lagging behind it, and some of those that 
rank higher than it, are below it in terms of per capita GNP. A comparison of the 2003 data of 
the ten Central and Eastern European capitals shows that life expectancy at birth is still among 
lowest (68,3 years for men and 76,5 years for women) in Budapest. The data for men are 
worse than this only in the Baltic capitals, while the data for women are better in all the 
capitals of the region. The mortality rate is the highest (1,4%) in Budapest, the number of 
deaths per 10 000 inhabitants due to neoplasms is the greatest (38,4) in Budapest, and only 
                                                 
12 Consider again the Hungarian Central Statistical Office’s data on life expectancy at birth in the former 
communist countries (with a focus on those that, by now, acceded to the European Union or are in the course of 
acceding to it). In 2002, life expectancy at birth for men was 68,9 years in Bulgaria, 72,1 in the Czech Republic, 
66,0 in Estonia, 68,3 in Hungary, 65,7 in Latvia, 66,5 in Lithuania, 70,5 in Poland, 67,8 in Rumania, 69,9 in 
Slovakia, and 72,6 in Slovenia, as against an average of 75,9 in the fifteen member states of the EU. In the same 
year, life expectancy at birth for women was 75,9 years in Bulgaria, 78,5 in the Czech Republic, 76,9 in Estonia, 
76,5 in Hungary, 76,8 in Latvia, 77,7 in Lithuania, 78,9 in Poland,75,3 in Rumania, 77,8 in Slovakia, and 80,4 in 
Slovenia as against the EU-15 average of 81,8. 
 
Riga surpasses Budapest in the number of deaths per 10 000 inhabitants due to diseases of the 
circulatory system (74,1 as against 69,4).13 
 
These sad data have one positive implication. Development assistance to efforts to improve 
on health conditions is expected to be allocated to the post-communist countries.14 Today, 
however, development organizations, including the agencies of the United Nations consider 
the promotion of human rights in the domain of health care as an integral part of any serious 
improvement.15 This gives a certain leverage to watchdog organizations that focus on the 
compliance of post-communist states with patients’ rights standards. In sum, we can expect 
that the pressure to comply better with this standards will not relent in the decade ahead of us. 
 
 
6. The Adoption of the new Health Act in 199716  
 
The Health Act adopted in 1972 said nothing about the right of the patient to accept or refuse 
the treatment proposed by his/her physician. This regulation (or the absence of it) did not run 
into trouble during the last decades of the communist regime. However, the transition to 
democracy made it untenable. 
 
The great value attributed to human rights in the post-transition decade encouraged various 
civil initiatives in this field, too.17 And the Constitutional Court’s practice in the first half of 
the 1990s served as another powerful engine of change. Initially, the Court understood its 
mission as raising the level of the protection of human rights above the international baseline 
set by the various human rights documents. In its rulings, it gave pride of place to the right to 
human dignity that it interpreted as an abstract principle encompassing many specific rights 
not explicitly mentioned in the constitution. Under this interpretation, various privacy rights 
and the right to personal self-determination are to be understood as so many specific instances 
of the more general right to human dignity.18 This reading of the constitution gave a big push 
to patients’ rights legislation, because it had a direct application to the problem of medical 
treatment and of the physician-patient relationship. 
 
But, perhaps, the strongest pressure in the direction of giving patients’ rights a legal 
expression came from the need to bring the Hungarian law into harmony with the 
international agreements signed and ratified by Hungary. In 1992-1993 the Ministry of Justice 
started  a big project of legal revision to uncover those parts of the law that are not in harmony 
with the rules and principles established by those agreements. In the first round such legal 
provisions have been changed that were found to be in a blatant conflict with the European 
Covenant on Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties.19 
                                                 
13 „Demographic trends in east-central european capitals.” International Comparisons 9. Budapest, 2005. 
Compiled by the Regional Dissemination Section of the Dissemination Department of Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office. 
14 Countries of CEE CIS have a high burden of adult mortality which need to attract developmental assistance. 
Source: Marc Suhrcke et al: Development assistance for health in central and eastern European Region.  Bulletin 
of the WHO  2005 December, 83 (12) pp: 920-926 
15 Craig G. Mokhiber: Toward a Measure of Dignity, Indicators for Rights-Based Development. In: Sofia et al, 
ed: Perspectives on Health and Human Rights. New York: Routledge 2005, p. 383. 
16 Law CLIV of 1997. 
17 For such an initiative regarding civil commitment see fn 4. 
18 Gábor Attila Tóth: Az emberi méltósághoz való jog és az élethez való jog. (The Right to Human Dignity and 
the Right to Life.) In: G. Halmai and G.A.Tóth, eds: Emberi jogok (Human Rights). Budapest: Osiris 2003. 
19 Act LXXXVII of 1994 on the modification of Act II of 1972 on Health Care. The amendment of the 
procedures of involuntary commitment mentioned in fn 4 was part of this package. 
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The new Health Act was adopted in 1997, in the same year when the Coucil of Europe took 
its landmark decision to issue a Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being with regard to Application of Biology and Medicine. The redaction of 
the Convention took seven years, and so those who participated in the preparations of the 
Hungarian Health Act had the opportunity to become acquainted with its guiding principles. 
The government’s decree as of 1996 that ordained the work on the replacement of the Health 
Act of 1972 by a new piece of legislation explicitly recognized the need for the new law to 
comply with the patients’ rights norms accepted by the international community.20 
 
When it came to a discussion of the bill in Parliament, both the Amsterdam Declaration and 
the Convention have been tabled with the M.P.s as background materials for health care 
legislation. This fact was of great significance. The law in force and the traditions of legal 
practice in Hungary were wide off the mark set by these two documents. Recognition of 
personal autonomy and particularly the understanding of its implications have been extremely 
underdeveloped in this country at the time when the new Health Act was adopted. The 
pressure of civil movements was relatively weak. The Constitutional Court, as I tried to show, 
has done much to establish certain general principles that are relevant for the issue of patients’ 
rights, but–unlike in the domain of data protection or environment protection–it did nothing to 
specify the consequences of these principles for the physician-patient relationship. Thus, civil 
initiatives and Court directives have been by and large replaced by the felt need that the law 
of the country must be brought in line with European legislation. This circumstance explains 
both why the Health Act could make a great leap forward towards meeting the standards of 
patients’ rights set by countries with a long tradition of progress in this direction, and why the 
translation of the law into living institutional practice was lagging behind, why it proceeded 
so slowly and in such an uneven manner. 
 
In Hungary, patients’ rights have not received legal recognition under pressure from civil 
society. If this issue received some public discussion from time to time, this is because the 
press was ready to report on the most outrageous human rights violations committed against 
psychiatric patients. Such descriptions of individual cases were not followed by a discussion 
of principle. The withdrawal of information on treatment, the non-availability of the option to 
refuse treatment was not put on the agenda. Treatment-related conflicts were not discussed 
from this perspective but from that of medical malpractice, such as post-operation death 
caused by a towel being left in the wound due to negligence. Even these days, almost ten 
years after the adoption of the Health Act, the issue of patients’ autonomy is almost 
completely absent from the public sphere, while that of medical malpractices is more and 
more present, and the number of malpractice trials is on a continuous rise over the years.21 
 
As an exception to te rule, the state of gynecology in Hungary, the difference between the 
quality of services in various different hospitals, the issue of the freedom to choose non-
conventional ways of delivery (giving birth at home, applying Ceasarian section) are almost 
continuously discussed in public, and civil groups are formed to promote the right of the 
patients in this domain. This may be explained by such facts as the pregnant woman being a 
healthy, autonomous person, not being dependent for her life on the physician. Also, the value 
of the child and general anxiety over the low level of birth-rates may contribute to it. 
                                                 
20 Government Decree No 1095/l996 (VIII.3.) on the main principles of the Health Act and on its preparation 
21 For a recent discussion of this topic, see Pálma Dobozi: A sok ügyelet is okozhat műhibát. (Too Many Night 
Duties May Also Be Responsible for Malpractice.) Magyar Hírlap, December 20, 2005  
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7. A view on the law and on the legal practice 
 
The Health Act of 1997 gives due recognition to the right of the patient to have adequate 
information on the planned treatment and to not being subjected to treatment in the absence of 
his/her consent (Section 3, Article 15). Thus, the patient may refuse the treatment, although 
the expression of the refusal is bound to follow more stringent rules than that of an eventual 
acceptance. If the refusal is likely to result in a serious degradation of the health status of the 
patient, its expression is not valid unless it is made in a written statement validitated by a 
public notary or in the presence of two witnesses (Section 2, Article 20). Even more stringent 
are the rules when it comes to a refusal of life sustaining treatment. Such a refusal must be 
accompanied by a statement of a three-member medical panel which is supposed to testify 
that 1. the patient is in a terminal state and, that, 2. her or his mental condition allows her or 
him to make a competent decision in a clear understanding of the consequences (Section 3-4, 
Article 20). 
 
The Hungarian Data Protection Act gives pride of place to the right of the individual to 
exercise control over the information about him or her. In constitutional jurisprudence this is 
called the right of informational self-determination. The Health Act recognizes this right and 
provides for its application in the domain of health care. It says that patients have a right to 
know their medical data, to look into their medical files, and to ask for a copy of these ( 
Article 24) 
 
Furthermore, the legislator took care to insert a provision in the Act that applies the 
constitutional principle of equal treatment by the law: the Act mandates that patients are to be 
treated equally without regard to their gender, health status, or personal convictions (Section 
1, Article 7). The equal treatment article explicitly provides for non-discrimination in the case 
of the psychiatrically ill  ( article 189 and 191). Mandatory treatment is made conditional, in 
conformity with the international standards, on a decision by a judge and on periodic judicial 
review ( Article 199-200).  
 
Thus, insofar as its broad outlines are concerned, the Health Act of 1997 can be said to 
comply with the current international standards. Beyond any question, it represents a 
landmark progress in the creation of a legal environment favorable for patient autonomy and 
self-determination. 
 
But I said earlier that there is a huge gap between legislation and legal practice. The progress 
in legislation was not followed by a proportional progress in legal practice. In most particular 
fields, the patients’ rights provisions of the Health Act remained on paper. In some fields, 
there was even regression. 
 
My contention is not that there was no further progress at all. In some specific fields, the 1997 
legislation was followed by progressive measures. For example, a ban on the use of cage beds 
in the institutes for people with mental disabilities has been adopted in a ministerial decree 
(Decree of the Minister of Health and Social Care of July 6, 2004). This decision has been 
taken against stubborn resistance of the majority of the psychiatric profession. In order to get 
to it, a relentless pressure on the part of civil groups was needed.22 But the decisive push, 
                                                 
22 Gábor Gombos, Eszter Kismódi, Katalin Pető. The Human Rights of Patients in Social Care Homes for the 
Mentally Ill. A report Published by the Mental Health Interest Forum in 2001. Cage Bads: Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment in four EU Accession Countries. A report published by the Mental Disability Advocacy 
Center, June 2003. 
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again, came from international organizations, from the Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CPT) of the Council of Europe that during its 
visit to Hungary in 1999 visited psychiatric institutions. There the Committe saw patients who 
were kept in cage beds. The Committe found this practice a grave violation of human rights 
and in his recommendation strongly insisted that the Hungarian autorities take instant 
measures to ban the use of cage beds23. 
 
The 1997 Act laid down general principles but stopped short of elaborating on the procedures 
required to translate principles into practice. For example, it provided for three important 
institutions to enforce and protect patients’ rights: the institution of a complaint procedure, 
that of the patients’ rights representative, and a mediating council. However, it left the 
elaboration of the specific rules of these institutions for further legal action, to be taken 
primarily by the Ministry of Health and Social Care. This action proceeded in a slow and 
uneven manner, the rules adopted in the end proved to be highly deficient, and their practical 
implementation is seriously unsatisfactory. It took years until the authorities started a training 
process for the personnel that is supposed to run these institutions. Although patients’ rights 
representatives are supposed to be available in every single hospital or clinic, the number of 
licenced representatives is so low that each of them must divide his or her time between more 
than one institutions. As a consequence, rather than being continuously available, they can be 
reached only once or twice a week for a couple of hours.24 
 
The downgrading of the institution of the patients’ rights representatives to near non-existence 
inflicts a serious practical and symbolic damage on the case of patients’ rights. It deprives 
patients of an important tool of empowerment vis-a-vis the hospital, of the support of an 
institutional authority. And it sends the message to all, including the physicians, that patients’ 
rights are to be treated as window-dressing meant to appease the outside world, rather than 
legal provisions with a genuine regulatory force that are to be taken seriously. 
 
Here is a further example: The law specifies a number of cases where the patients must 
receive written information on their rights. For example, psychiatric patients need to know the 
rules of civil commitment, and it is an important guarantee for their being indeed informed 
that the requisite information is provided to them in writing (Section 2, Article 191). Three 
years after the coming into force of the law, a human rights organization made an inquiry in a 
number of hospitals on how widely the brochures on patients’ rights are made available to the 
patients of medical institutions. As it turned out, no single hospital provided psychiatric 
patients with any kind of written information at their reception department.25  
 
One last example to show that, up to these days, the official attitude of neglect and disregard 
towards patients’ rights has not significantly changed. In the Fall of 2005, the government 
submitted its National Program to Combat Cancer to public discussion. The Program outlines 
a ten-year plan to improve the present, deplorably poor situation of the country with regard to 
treating cancerous illnesses. An earlier version of the document included a section on the 
problem of patients’ rights in this particular field. In that, unpublished, version the document 
                                                 
23 See Introduction, Report to the Hungarian Government on the Visit to Hungary carried out by CPT from 5 to 
16 December 1999 (March, 2000), p. 8. 
24 The Parliamentary Commissioner of Civil Rights announced in 2003 that unless the salary of the patients’ 
rights representatives and the funds covering the costs of their services will be raised, the system may become 
unworkable. See OBH 3155/2002. 
25 See Orsolya Heuer, ed: Patient Rights in Hungary- Rules and Practice. Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, 
Budapest 2002. p. 27. 
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extensively dealt with the deficiencies in providing the patients with information, and the 
ways those deficiencies should be overcome. It went as far as proposing that physicians 
should receive training to improve their communications capabilities. But even this attractive 
document failed to mention that patients need information in order to be able to make 
adequate decisions on whether they as the ultimate decision maker should accept the 
treatment proposed by their physician. And when, in October of this year, the National 
Program to Combat Cancer was submitted for public discussion, the section on information 
was totally absent from it.  
 
To take stock: the 1997 Health Act was made in compliance with the international principles 
of patients’ rights. But most the questions left open by the legislator for lower-level regulation 
and for institutional practice remained unresolved or have been resolved in a spirit alien to 
that of the Act. This spirit is informed by the paternalistic heritage I have spoken about 
earlier. The Health Act represents a new paradigm, that of patient autonomy and self-
determination. But the legal and institutional practice continues to follow the old paradigm of 
paternalism. Rather than yielding to the new paradigm, it assimilates the concepts and ideas of 
paitents’ rights to the old paradigm. 
 
With these preliminaries in mind, let us turn to the three specific problem areas mentioned in 
Section 1, the rights of the people with no or limited competency, the right to refuse 
treatment, and the so-called reproductive rights, where the gap between legislation and legal 
practice is particularly wide or self-determination is particularly limited. 
 
 
8. Competency as a condition of the right to consent 
 
8.1 The Health Act on competence 
 
In constitutional democracies, individuals are not protected by coercive interference against 
their own choices and acts that may cause harm to themselves. There are only two types of 
cases where mistaken decisions may be interfered with coercively: first, when the decision 
involves extreme and (usually) irreversible consequences and, second, where the agent lacks 
the competence to foresee and to understand the consequences of his/her choice. In the latter 
cases, however, the presumption of competence is the default position. Incompetence must be 
established in a strict procedure that protects the person under investigation against invasion 
of his or her autonomy. 
 
Clearly, any regulation of such procedures must start out from an adequate definition of 
competency and of its complete or partial absence. However, the Health Act fails to address 
the criteria of competence in the particular field of decisions about treatment. It does not 
provide any definition of either competency or limited competency or else a full absence of 
competency.Therefore, law enforcement agencies have to consult the Civil Code for a 
definition.  
 
This gives a leeway to paternalism, for the following reason. As the Constitutional Court has 
ruled, when it comes to judge about competency in the context of medical intervention, the 
standard must be different from that in the Civil Code. „It should not be disregarded”, the 
Court says, „that competency, i.e. the decision making capacity needed for handling one’s 
affairs is originally and primarily defined by the Civil Code as a condition for making 
property-related declarations. When it comes to extending this system of concepts to other 
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branches of the law, it is necessary to take the specific characteristics of these domains into 
consideration.”26 
 
The relevant questions of competency in the context of medical decisions are as follows: Is 
the patient capable of understanding the information’s on her/his health status, on the 
proposed intervention and on the consequences of either the intervention or of refusing it? Is 
he/she capable of balancing these considerations against each other in the light of his or her 
interests, values and convictions?27 It is quite possible for these questions to admit a positive 
answer in the case of an individual who would count as incompetent in the domain of 
property-related decisions. The failure of the law to address such questions leaves open the 
possibility for declaring a patient who would count as competent under area-specific 
investigation to be incompetent nevertheless, and dealing with him or her according to the old 
paternalistic ways. 
 
Moreover, the Act remains silent on the question, how to proceed when there is no judicial 
decision that would declare the patient incompetent but the patient’s conduct makes it clear 
that he or she obviously lacks the relevant decision-making capacities. It is also silent on 
those cases where the physician is dealing with an adult who is not legally incompetent (to 
take a competent decision regarding his or her property, for example) but who is unable to 
take competent decision on his treatment. The time needed for the judicial procedure of 
declaring a person incompetent may be one year in Hungary. In a typical case, decision on 
treatment must be made within a much shorter delay. There is no way to tell, on the basis of 
the law, who has the authority to declare the patient incompetent in cases of urgency. These 
deficiencies create further opportunities for paternalistic violations of patients’ rights. 
 
8.2 Treatment decision in the case of incompetent patients 
 
The failure of the law to deal adequately with the problem of competence in the context of 
health care decisions has yet another unfortunate consequence. By the Civil Code the person 
who is declared incompetent, loses these decision-making rights completely. So a person who 
has been declared incompetent by a court before taken to the hospital, does not have any 
power to decide on treatment. There are no issues whatsoever which would be left for him or 
her to decide upon as an ultimate instance.  
 
In the province of health care as in other provinces of human life, the rules concerning 
competence ought to be sufficiently fine-tuned so that a not fully competent person is not 
excluded from the medical decisions except for those specific areas with regard to which he or 
she may be judged to lack the mental tools necessary for adequate decision making. Even the 
less-than-fully competent person must be treated in such a manner as to maximally preserve 
his or her decision-making capacity28.  
 
Unfortunately, the Act fails to provide sufficient regulation in this regard. It provides for only 
that much that a patient deprived of the power to decide on his or her treatment should still 
receive information on treatment and, that, his or her desires should be taken into 
                                                 
26 CC ruling No 36/2000 (X.27.) 
27 „The competency to decide on medical intervention includes the capacity of the person to grasp the 
information necessary for the decision, the capacity to recognize all the possible consequences of the decision, 
and the capacity to communicate the decision to the physician.”  CC ruling No 98/B/1992.  
28 See Recommendation (99) 4 of the Council of Europe on Principles Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Incapable Adults.  
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consideration within the limits set by the professional requirements of treatment (Section 5, 
Aticle 13 and Section 5, Article 16). This is very far from meeting the requirement that the 
choice of treatment pay respect to the values, convictions, and preferences of the person in 
question. Again, we find the room for paternalistic procedures wide open. 
 
There are further unjustified restrictions imposed on the legally incompetent. In the case of an 
incompetent patient, consent by a surrogate decision-maker29 is not required by the law except 
in those cases where the medical procedure is invasive. Any other kind of intervention (for 
example, a diagnostic examination or a therapy by neuroleptic drugs) can be performed 
without asking for the agreement either of the patient or of her surrogate (Section 4, Article 
16). 
 
8.3 Persons with limited competency 
 
The Hungarian law does not completely ignore the concept of limited competency, an 
intermediate stage between the full presence and the complete absence of the decision-making 
capacity. According to the Civil code, someone with a significantly reduced capacity to 
comprehend the circumstances under which he or she has to deal with his or her personal 
affairs is a person with limited competence. If an individual is declared by a court, without 
any specification, to be of limited competency, and a custodian is appointed to him or her to 
run his/her affairs, then the presumption is that he or she cannot make any legal steps without 
the custodian’s consent.30 This presumption still admits of exceptions. A person with limited 
competency can proceed autonomously in some of his or her affairs: he/she is free to make 
ordinary contracts of a smaller significance, for example. He or she has the power to proceed 
in the protection of his/her personality rights. In general, he or she is at liberty to engage in 
contractual relationships provided that these do not involve but advantages for him/her. 
 
A thoroughgoing amendment of the Civil Code in 2001 empowered courts to declare someone 
lacking sufficient comprehension of the conditions of specific decisions only rather than 
imposing a general limitation on his/her right to take autonomous decisions. If so, a guardian 
needs to be appointed only for the aim of taking those specific decisions enumerated in the 
judgment.31 For example, an individual may be declared to be of limited competency to deal 
with his or her movable and immovable property, in which case he or she is left at liberty to 
take autonomous decisions in all other domains.  
 
Such a regulation would involve, even for those declared to be of limited competency in 
general (and for those between 14 and 18 who count to be of limited competency on the 
ground of their age), that such persons must have a right to take autonomous decisions with 
regard to their medical treatment so long as their decision does not come into conflict with 
their interests. It is only in these latter cases that the guardian may be involved in the decision 
making process. 
 
The term „person with limited competency” makes its appearance in the Health Act, too. 
However, the Act does not apply ’limited competency’ to all the contexts where its use would 
be legitimate, nor does it determine the rights possessed by a patient with limited competence 
                                                 
29 Unless an incompetent patient made an advance directive on who should decide on his or her behalf before it 
came to a court declaring him or her incompetent, the right to decide in matters that regard him or her goes over 
automatically to their guardian identified according to the law. Section 2, Article 16 of the Health Care Act. 
30 Hungarian Civil Code, Articles  12 to 15/A .  
31 Civil Code, Sections 5 and 6 of Article 14. 
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with sufficient care. Not unlike a person declared incompetent, a person with limited 
competency is totally deprived by the law from the right to practice informed consent.32 He or 
she cannot give or refuse consent to the proposed treatment; this should be done by a 
surrogate decision-maker. Such an interpretation of the limitations on the autonomy of an 
individual with limited competency leaves much less to the patient to decide on his or her 
own, and it counts as an unreasonable interference with the self-determination of persons 
whose competence is limited either by their age or by their mental state. 
 
In October 2002, the Constitutional Court struck down this regulation as unconstitutional and 
mandated that the Parliament makes new rules on informed consent in the case of patients 
with limited competency.33 The Parliament did comply with the ruling but the new piece of 
legislation failed to bring significant improvement. As a small step forward, patients with 
limited competency may have access to their medical files if they wish so. However, insofar 
as participation in the treatment decisions are concerned, the new regulation, rather than 
applying to all patients with limited competence, applies only to those whose competency 
counts as limited on the ground of their age. A subgroup within this category, those between 
16 and 18 are now permitted to name their surrogate decision-maker or to exclude their legal 
representative from taking decisions on their behalf with regard to medical treatment.34 
 
To sum up: The health care regulation in force subjects self-determination of people with 
limited competency (whether for reason of age or for any other reason) to unnecessary and 
disproportional restrictions. Three main facts can be cited in support of this claim: 
• first, the Health Act fails to provide any criteria to draw a line between competence 
and incompetence in the context of various treatment-regarding decisions; 
• second, the Act fails to distinguish different degrees of competence, and it denies the 
right to practice informed consent to all whose decision-making capacity is 
diminished; 
• and, third, even the surrogate decision-maker has no complete control over the issues 
of medical treatment of a person with less than full competency: he or she is not 
allowed to make a decisive statement on treatment but in the case of invasive medical 
action–all action judged non-invasive is subject to the exclusive authority of the 
physician. 
 
 
9. Can the patient refuse life-sustaining treatment? 
 
As I mentioned it already, the Health Act treats the right to refuse the proposed treatment 
differently from the right of expressing its acceptance. The rules of the refusal are much more 
differentiated and restrictive. The more heavy the likely consequences of the omission of a 
certain treatment procedure, and the more stringent the requirements set by the law for the 
practice of the right of refusal.  
                                                 
32 Like the concepts of competence and incompetence, that of limited competence originates with the Civil Code. 
If competence is taken to mean a general decision-making capacity, then a person counts as having limited 
competence if she or he has not fully lost this capacity, only to a greater or smaller degree. Incompetent is a 
person whose decision-making capacity is completely absent. Section 4, Article 14 of the Civil Code (Act IV of 
1957) 
33 CC ruling No 36/2000 (X.27.)The ruling of the CC has pointed out that the Civil Code construes the protection 
of the personality rights and of personal autonomy as applied to persons with a limited competency than the 
Health Act. A person with alimited competency has the right, according to the Civil Code, to take steps to defend 
his/her personality rights. However, medical treatment eminently affects personality rights. 
34 1997:CLIV. 16.§ (6) and 24.§ (6) 
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The most controversial of all such restrictions are those that apply to decisions regarding 
terminal states. These decisions have two aspects to be distinguished from each other. 
 
• First, the evolution of medical techniques significantly increased, in the last couple of 
decades, the medical profession’s capacity to prolong life almost indefinitely by 
applying previously unavailable life-saving and–in particular–life-sustaining methods. 
The availability of such techniques makes the problem of paternalism particularly 
acute because it creates an opportunity for physicians to prolong the life of their 
patients indefinitely, even against their will. Therefore, the question of refusing 
medical intervention becomes a central issue for patients in a terminal state. If they 
are denied the status of an ultimate decision maker on whether these methods are to 
be applied in their case, they completely lose control over themselves to the providers 
of health care who will be in a position to prolong their lives against their wishes. 
This raises the question of the right to refuse medical intervention even if it has life-
saving or life-sustaining functions or, to put it in different terms, the question of 
passive euthanasia. 
• Second, once in a terminal state, a human being may prefer to end his or her life 
quickly and painlessly, in order to avoid undue physical and/or mental suffering. But 
in such a state, one may not be able to terminate one’s life without a physician’s 
assistance. This raises the question, whether the right to life does entail the right to 
decide about the timing of the end of one’s life and, if yes, whether this right entails a 
claim to assistance (usually by a physician) in carrying out one’s will. This is the 
question of physician-assisted suicide or even physician-performed euthanasia or, to 
put it differently, the question of voluntary active euthanasia. This question reflects 
the conflict between the patient autonomy paradigm and the paternalistic paradigm, 
and it has a related but slightly different aspect, too: that of a conflict between patient 
autonomy and the claim that given the sanctity of life, humans have a duty not to 
interfere with the natural course of their dying. 
 
The Health Act does not even mention active euthanasia. Instead, it provides for a right to 
pain relief and palliative care as the legitimate claim of the terminally ill against the health 
care system. Humane treatment in the final stages of the life of the individual is something 
which is due to him or her as a person possessing a status of human dignity.  
 
The provisions of the law on pain relief and palliative care remained a dead letter until, 
ironically, the issue of active euthanasia, completely absent from it, became a central topic of 
public controversy. Here is how this happened. 
 
Public opinion in Hungary strongly supports euthanasia in both its passive and active forms. 
More than 60 percent of the adult population favor physican-assisted termination of life, if the 
patient so desires.35 Already in the early 1990s, a petition has been filed with the 
Constitutional Court, asking, among other thing, that the Court declare unconstitutional the 
absence of legal provisions that would permit and regulate voluntary active euthanasia. The 
Court, although it agreed to give a hearing to the case, evaded the discussion of it for almost a 
decade. However, not unrelated to the pressure from the public, it has put the issue on its 
agenda in 2003 and, in April of that year, passed its ruling.36 It rejected the claim that the 
                                                 
35 Nehéz kérdések a kegyes halálról (Difficult questions on mercy killing). Medián Public Opinion Center. 
Budapest, December 2000. 
36 CC ruling No 22/2003 (IV.28.) AB. 
 17
absence, in the Hungarian law, of a rule providing for the right to active euthanasia is 
unconstitutional. But it did not justify this negative ruling by appealing to the sanctity of 
human life, or by denying that the right to life would entail a right to decide about when and 
how to end one’s life. On the contrary, it stated that the general right to personal self-
determination, a universal human right, includes the aspecific right to decide about the end of 
one’s life. But, then, it continued by denying that this claim could be translated into a legal 
right under all circumstances. It held that under certain conditions the choice of death is but a 
desperate reaction to the absence of adequate palliative care. And the law should not 
legitimize such a choice, the Court hastened to add. Legalization of physician-assisted 
termination of one’s life will not be permissible until the considered choice of the patient will 
be one between accepting an adequate palliative care, and terminating one’s life because it is 
not deemed worth continuing even in the presence of such a humane alternative. Thus, the 
Court made the constitutionality of voluntary active euthanasia conditional on the 
improvement of health care provision. And it made it the obligation of the Parliament to 
watch the progress in this domain so that it could in due time decide whether the conditions 
are ripe for the legislation on active euthanasia. 
 
Whatever the merits of this decision,37 it had an unexpected consequence: immediately after 
the public announcement of the ruling, civil groups addressed the Committee on Health Care 
of the Parliament with a demand to make an investigation into the state of palliative care in 
Hungary. The Deputy of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights announced that he, 
too, will make an inquiry. The poor state of the care of the terminally ill could not be kept 
neglected any more. It was in response to this situation that the NHI decided to announce a 
competition for funding hospice services (see Section 1). 
 
Let me now address the issue of passive euthanasia. Unlike active euthanasia that is not even 
mentioned by the law, the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is explicitly recognized by 
it (Section 3, Article 20). This is an important step forward, at least in principle. However, the 
mere recognition that patients have a right to refuse treatment even if its omission or cessation 
makes death predictable does not enable the bearers of this right to practice it. Whether or not 
the right to refuse treatment has legal force, depends on the way its practice is regulated.  
 
The Health Act does not stop at making the presumption that life-sustaining treatment can be 
refused. It makes the refusal, for it be effective, conditional on procedural requirements. In 
itself, setting such conditions does not count as an unconstitutional invasion of the right in 
question. Given the gravity and irreversibility of the decision, and the possibility for abuse, it 
is reasonable to subject the procedure to such rules that make the process transparent and 
exclude both uncertainty as to the will of the patient and discontinuation of medical assistance 
against that will.38  
 
But it is unreasonable and unacceptably paternalistic to subject the process to conditions of 
such a stringency that they are nearly impossible to meet. And this is the case with the 
regulation provided by the Health Act. A patient has to make five different, consecutive 
statements demanding that life-sustaining support be withdrawn from him or her, on five 
different occasions. Not before he made the fifth one, can he hope his will to be executed. But 
not even after the fifth statement can he be certain that this is what is going to happen. The 
                                                 
37 It is cerainly not lagging behind the European average, as there are only three countries in Europe where the 
law permits the physician to assist the dying person to terminate his or her life: in Belgium and the Netherlands 
voluntary active euthanasia is legalized, while in Switzerland assisted suicide is immune to prosecution. 
38 See the reasoning of the CC ruling No 22/2003 (IV.28.) AB. 
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first statement comes when he announces his desire to the physician. The second follows 
when a written version of the statement is made. Next, a three-member medical panel 
examines the case, and the statement must be repeated in their presence. Fourth, three days 
after the panel makes a positive verdict, a new statement is to be made in the presence of two 
witnesses in which the patient expresses his or will to go on rather than to change the earlier 
decision. Fifth, after the confirmation is done, an in-depth interview must be conducted by the 
physician to explore the reasons why the patient wants the life-sustaining treatment to be 
withdrawn rather than continued. The physician is supposed to make an attempt to convince 
the patient, in the course of this conversation, that he or she should change the already settled 
decision in favor of accepting the continuation of medical support. If, against all the 
arguments, the latter persists in his or her stance, the physician still may decide that the will of 
the patient is not sufficiently clear and, that, the treatment must go on (Articles 20-23).  
 
If followed word by word, such an absurd regulation makes the refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment technically impossible to carry out. And it conveys the message that the general 
principle recognized by the law is not to be taken seriously. The patients’ rights paradigm 
must not be abided by; medical practice is allowed to go on following the paternalistic 
paradigm. No wonder that the three-member panels of physicians do not exist in the hospitals. 
Nor are any written statements asking for a discontinuation of life support to be found. Nor 
are any data available on the number of cases of a patient refusing life-sustaining treatment. 
The author of this policy paper asked the question to leading representatives of the Hungarian 
Medical Chamber and of the Ministry of Health, how many cases there are since the law’s 
coming into force when a patient insisted on the withdrawal of life support, and nobody was 
able to give at least an informed guess. Apparently, if such discontinuations occur, they do not 
follow the procedure set by the law. The Deputy of the Parliamentary Commissioner on Civil 
Rights made an attempt to inquire into this problem, but the hospitals denied him any access 
to the medical files. Ironically, they justified this refusal by appealing to the right of the 
patients to retain their control over their personal data.39 
 
 
10. Informed consent and reproductive rights 
 
The awareness of people that they are bearers of rights that others have to respect and the state 
has to enforce is not even. Hungarian citizens are not particularly conscious of some of their 
rights, and very conscious of some others. Furthermore, their attitudes towards their rights are 
changing through time. Rights the public was not aware of in the past may become highly 
visible for it. The transition from communism to democracy dramatically raised the public’s 
rights-consciousness. But people are particularly keen about some of their rights, and less so 
about others. I mentioned already the right to euthanasia, both passive and active, which 
commands the support of almost two-thirds of the adult population in Hungary. Even higher is 
the support for reproductive rights. First, more people insist on such rights than on the rights 
related to the end-of-the-life decisions. And, secondly, they are more intense and vocal about 
the first than about the latter. In modern, secularized societies many people (whether religious 
or not otherwise) put a high premium on limiting the risk of unplanned pregnancy, and 
Hungary is no exception in this regard. 
 
In countries where abortion on demand is legally banned, the key issue is to make the ban 
repealed, so that women become free from legal obstacles to have access to abortion  
                                                 
39 Adatvédelem gátolja a betegjogi ellenőrzést. (Data protection in the way of checking whether patients’ rights 
are respected by hospitals.) Magyar Hírlap, February 1, 2002.  
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in the first tree months of their pregnancy. Thus, the first task concerning the right to abortion 
is to secure control over one’s own body as a negative freedom, i.e. as the freedom for a 
woman to seek services of her choice unimpeded by government interference. Once this 
freedom from legal obstacles is secured, however, a new question emerges: whether 
reproductive rights are merely negative, or they also include positive components. In other 
words, the second question is, whether the government has an obligation to make sure that the 
conditions for self-determination are equally available to all. Once this second question is 
raised, the scope of reproductive rights is enlarged from access to abortion to an access to 
other services such as sterilization, contraception, IVF.40   
 
The issues of reproductive health are not subject to special regulation under Hungarian law. 
All reproduction-related issues–except for those of abortion–are supposed to be dealt with by 
the Health Act. Insofar as the issues of positive reproductive rights are raised at all, the 
services in question and the conditions for a woman (or, occasionally, a man) to have access 
to them, are listed in this law, while the question of charges is discussed in the health 
insurance regulations.41 
 
A key issue in the field of positive reproductive rights is whether contraceptives are to be 
made available free of charge to certain groups of women, such as the poor and those below 
18. This issue is not attacked as one of rights, though, but as a problem of social policy. As 
the level of general sexual education raises and effective contraceptives become available to 
those capable of buying them, the rate of abortions is continuously decreasing. While, in 
Hungary, it was around 80 thousand per year in the 1980s, the average number of abortions is 
down around 54 thousand in this decade.42 However, there is no similarly steep decrease in 
the age group below 18. Governments on the right tend to explain this problem by a 
weakening of the virtue of abstention, while governments on the left consider it as an 
evidence for a failure of sexual education and for insufficient availability of contraceptives for 
these generations. Thus, Christian-nationalist governments make attempts to restrict the 
access to abortion but, in the face of a vigilant public opinion, have to proceed very 
cautiously. Socialist-liberal governments, on the other hand, promise to make contraceptives 
for those below 18 free of charge, however, up to these days, this promise has not been made 
true. Although the Professional College of Gynecologist supported the introduction of the 
abortion pill as an alternative to surgical intervention, no such step has been taken. 
 
Access to assisted reproduction is another hotly debated issue with positive-rights 
implications. The rate of infertility in Hungary is 15%, close to the European average. 
However, the rate of test-tube fertilizations is ways below the European one: in Europe, 3-4% 
of the newborn come from test-tube fertilization, while in Hungary this proportion is 1.4%, 
less than half of the European average.43 The Civil Association for Test-Tube Babies, an 
                                                 
40 Rebecca J. Cook, Bernard M. Dickens, Mahmoud F.Fathalla: Reproductive Health and Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, 2003, p. 8. 
41 The Constitutional Court did not address the issue of positive reproductive rights specifically, but it made in 
other contexts a general ruling to the effect that the state’s obligations do not stop at respecting and making 
respect the negative rights of the citizens: it has a positive obligation to create an institutional framework that 
makes the negative rights meaningful for all. See CC rulings No 64/1991.(XII.17.), No 43/1995(VI.30.), and 
No52/1995(IX.15.). 
42 The number of abortions per one hundred newborns was 90 394 in 1990, in order to drop to 52 539 by 2004. 
See Hungarian Central Statistical Office, STADAT – 1.1.1. Népesség, népmozgalom (Population and its 
Changes). 
43 Hajnal Kulcsár: Elbocsátás fenyegeti a "lombikos" szülőket („Test-tube” Parents Threatened by Dismissal). In  
HVG Online, April 4, 2005.  
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NGO working in this field, filed a petition with the legislature in the Spring 2005 to convince 
the M.P.s that the access to test-tube fertilization is a right and, that, the government should 
make sure that this right can be practices by increasing the number of fertility centers, by 
raising the level of  the financial support to test-tube programs (at present, the Health 
Insurance Caisse covers 50% of the costs of the program up to maximum five attempts at 
fertilization and implantation), and by making publicly accessible the data on the success rate 
of the particular centers.  
 
Furthermore, the Health Act does not provide for access to test-tube fertilization to anyone but 
married couples and those living in civil companionship. Marriage is an institution available 
to heterosexual couples only. Although, since the mid-nineties, civil union is made available 
to same-sex couples as well, the latter are not eligible, under the law, to an access to test-tube 
fertilization, not even if they are willing to cover the full costs of the program. Nor do single 
women enjoy eligibility under any condition, or at least this was the case until very recently, 
when the law was amended in this regard.44 Moreover, couples (married or not) where one of 
the partners is declared of limited competency, are excluded from eligibility, whether or not 
the infertile partner is the same as the one whose competency is declared to be limited. The 
justification for this is based on the procedural requirement that the couple should make a 
consensual request for a test-tube experiment. So even if the member of the couple who needs 
the assistance in fertilization is fully competent, the consent of the other would be needed, but 
persons with a limited competency are deprived by the law of the power to give valid consent 
(see Section 8). Yet again, paternalism gets the overhand in its conflict with patient autonomy. 
 
When, in November of 2005, a package of amendments to the Health Act has been tabled to 
the legislature, the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union filed a petition with the M.P.s proposing 
to change the discriminative provisions.45 However, the Ministry of Health refused to support 
the proposal, and no MP expressed a willingness to translate it into an official amendment 
motion.46 Nevertheless, when it came to the Parliamentary debate of the bill in December 
2005, MPs from the Government majority submitted a proposal with the aim of allowing to 
single infertile women the access to the reproductive services. This proposal, adopted by the 
legislature, left same-sex couples deprived of any access to assisted reproduction.  
 
The Health Act as it was adopted in 1997 included a provision allowing for surrogate 
motherhood. However, when the Christian-nationalist right came to government in 1998, it 
proposed an amendment (adopted in 1999) that banned the recourse to a surrogate mother. 
This move, a clear violation of the right to reproductive health in the case of women whose 
womb has been removed, has never been undone afterwards. When it returned to power, the 
socialist-liberal coalition promised to restore the articles on surrogate motherhood as soon as 
an amendment of the law will be on the agenda. Since 2002, the year of the formation of the 
socialist-liberal government, the Health Act was twice subjected to amendments, but nothing 
happened in the field of surrogate motherhood. 
                                                 
44 From July 1, 2006, single women can also have access to assisted reproduction provided that, „for reasons of 
age or condition (infertility) she is unable to give birth to a child in a natural way”. Health Act, Section 4 of 
Article 167. 
45 Statement 26 of HCLU. See: www.tasz.hu. 
46 The Hungarian law is not exceptional in this regard. A new fertility law has been adopted in Italy in 2004 that 
bans donation of sperm and eggs, defines life as beginning at conception, and allows fertility treatment only to 
married heterosexual couples. A referendum was held in May 2005 upon the initiative of the Radical Party with 
the aim to overturn key provisions of the law. Although several polls showed that Italian voters largely support 
repealing the sections in question, the referendum ended up as invalid because of low participation. „In Political 
Step Pope Confronts Law on Fertility”, The New York Times, May 31, 2005 
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Let us now have a look at the abortion law (it is called, tellingly, Law on the Protection of 
Fetal Life).47 Even a cursory examination of the law will show that the reproductive rights of 
the woman are unduly restricted in this domain, too. The law secures a more or less adequate 
access to abortion in the cases where the demand for it is based on medical reasons. However, 
it fails to provide for abortion on the ground that the pregnancy is not wanted. If the pregnant 
woman has no medical reasons to support her request, she must support it by a reference to a 
„situation of social crisis”. In this case, she has to attend a councelling session, where the 
counsellor (usually a nurse) may ask her to reveal her reasons and to discuss them with her, 
and where the job of the counsellor is to try to convince the woman that given the seriousness 
of her moral responsibility towards the fetus, she should not seek an abortion. Counselling 
would not get in conflict with the principle of autonomy and self-determination if it were to 
be offered on a voluntaristic basis. In such a case, the counsellor is supposed to provide the 
pregnant woman with information and to offer her support in her search for a  decision that 
would reflect her values and informed desires. However, mandatory counselling where the 
counsellor’s job is to try to make the woman seeking an abortion to give up that intention, is 
not a form of assistance but an unacceptable invasion of the woman’s privacy. It violates the 
principle of patient autonomy in the name of paternalism and of a moralistic claim that 
carrying out the pregnancy is a duty that society has a right to remind the woman to. 
 
Autonomy of choice entails that the decision is not made dependent on the consent of a third 
party. Teenagers under 18 must have this autonomy in a number of issues as large as possible 
and certainly increasing with age. Abortion belongs to that category where a pregnant girl has 
a strong claim to autonomy in this sense. However, bowing to the paternalistic principle, the 
abortion law refuses to allow this autonomy to the girls under 18. Although the presence of a 
parent at the mandatory counselling is not required, the abortion cannot be performed unless 
parental agreement is expressed in writing. The requirement of parental notification–not 
allowing even for a medical exeption–makes it hard for pregnant girls to seek a physician’s 
assistance.48  
 
We can, however, register some progress in the domain of reproductive rights.  
• In 1995, the Constitutional Court struck down a legal provision concerning artificial 
sterilization. That provision made the access to physician-performed sterilization 
conditional on the woman having three children already or, alternatively, on her 
reaching the age of 35 years. 49 The Court declared this requirement unconstitutional 
as disproportional interference with the right to self-determination.  
• Also in 2005, the health care authorities gave license to the establishment of stem cells 
banks. 
• Finally, sperm and egg donation by identified persons was legalized in this year , 
making it possible to close kins to donate sperm or egg to each other. 
 
                                                 
47 Act LXXIX of 1992. 
48 The US Supreme Court heard arguments in a New Hampshire abortion-related case on November 30, 2005, 
revisiting  the question of whether the parental notice law in force in New Hampshire is unconstitutional. (Of the 
43 states that require parental involvement in a teenager's abortion decision, New Hampshire is one of only five 
not to include an explicit health exception in the text of the statute. All the laws do make exceptions for life-
threatening medical emergencies.) The justices appeared to be in broad agreement on two propositions: that laws 
regulating teenagers' access to abortion must make allowances for medical emergencies; and that the New 
Hampshire law, requiring notice to one parent and a 48-hour waiting period, failed to do so. See New York 
Times, December 1, 2005. 
49 See Section 2 of Article 187 of the Health Act. 
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As to the reproduction procedures facilitated by recent discoveries in genetics, such as genetic 
profiling of babies, creation of sperms and eggs from stem cells, cloning of human embrios,  
creation of human embryos with genetic material from two mothers, these have not given rise 
yet to much public controversy in Hungary. Although these issues are hotly debated in 
bioethical committees and even in the science sections of newspapers in Western Europe, they 
remained, for the time being, beyond the horizons of the Hungarian public. As an early 
exception, the issue of sex-selection of fetuses has been raised in a media campaign of the 
government in the Summer of 2005. The campaign failed to elicit great interest–only three 
thousand people volunteered to respond to the question–but a large majority of this relatively 
small number supported the proposition that parents should have the choice in the case of 
their third child and afterwards.  
 
 
11. Policy proposals 
 
11.1 In the domain of legislation 
 
When it came to an amendment of the Health Act, the legislature made significant steps 
towards transforming the paternalist model of the physician-patient relationship into a model 
based on informed consent. According to the law, the ultimate decision on whether the 
proposed treatment should be applied or not lies with the patient. However, neither the 
Parliament nor the Ministry of Health that was responsible for submitting the draft of the law 
to the legislature initiated any inquiry on the way the provisions on patients’ rights are 
translated into practice.50 Given that treatment decisions affect the constitutional rights of 
patients to self-determination, the issue is serious enough to justify a joint initiative by the 
Health Committee and the Constitutional and Legal Committee of the Parliament to launch an 
investigation on  
• whether the institutions foreseen by the law to guarantee that patients’ rights are duly 
respected did come into existence and, if the answer is yes,  
• whether they work with sufficient efficacy; 
• whether the rules in force are capable of securing personal self-determination in the 
domain of health care; and, finally, 
• whether patient have the opportunity to exercise in practice the rights the Health Act 
recognizes them to possess. 
 
It is time to initiate this investigation now, and it is highly desirable for it to be conducted 
with an eye on whether the law’s provisions on patients’ rights are translated into living legal 
practice. Such an inquiry could result in a proposal to amend the Act with the aim of giving 
specific regulatory content to the general principles of patients’ self-determination and of 
rectifying the rules of the law that run against those principles. 
 
The inquiry need not to start in a void. Even before it is completed, one can identify a number 
of issues where significant change will be needed. 
 
• It is against the spirit of the constitution to treat, as the law does,  patients with limited 
competency on a par with those who count as incompetent. To subject the first to the 
                                                 
50 The Legislation Act mandates that „the organs of legislation and of law application must examine the impact 
of the application of legal rules, they must uncover the circumstances that prevent the law’s provisions from 
being followed in practice, and the experiences must be made use in the legislative process”. Law XI of 1987, 
Article 44.  
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same restrictions that apply on the second is an unnecessary and disproportionate 
restriction of patient autonomy – it amounts to a paternalistic interference with 
personal self-determination in the domain of health care. The concept of competence 
needs to be given a specific, treatment-related definition. The law should provide 
different rules for different aspects of decisions concerning treatment even for the 
same categories of patients with limited or no competence. The surrogate decision-
maker must have the same powers to take decisions on behalf of the person 
represented by him or her as any fully competent patient would have in his or her own 
case. 
 
• It is against the spirit of the constitution completely to deprive young people under 18 
of the right to take decisions concerning their treatment. Those above 16 must have the 
right to choose the institution and the physician of their preference, and to take the 
ultimate decision on whether to accept or refuse the proposed treatment. Notification 
of the parents and demand of their agreement to an abortion under 18 should not be a 
requirement. Patients below 16 must have the right to take part actively in the process 
leading to a decision on their treatment. 
• It is against the spirit of the constitution to make for the terminally ill prohibitively 
burdensome the practice of his or her right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The 
procedure must be simplified so as to make this option freely accessible. 
• It is against the spirit of the constitution to discriminate between clients asking for 
medical assistance in reproduction, on grounds unrelated to their health condition 
(such as marital status, sexual orientation, etc.). Therefore, the rules of assisted 
reproduction must be changed in such a way as to bring them in line with the 
constitutional principle of non-discrimination. 
• The law should anticipate the emergence of new medical procedures, at least those 
which are likely to become available in the foreseeable future. As Hungary’s 
ambiguous experience with the stem cells banks shows, it is not a fortunate situation to 
have a technique available for use before the relevant legal regulation is there. 
• Genetic data should be treated separately as a category of unusually sensitive personal 
data that require special regulation. Collecting and storing such data have much more 
serious consequences for the data subject than collecting and storing any other medical 
data. Thus, the individual’s right to privacy and his or her right to control regarding 
genetic data demands special rules with a particular stringency. These rules are to be 
created before the obtaining of genetic data becomes a general practice. 
 
11.2 In the domain of advocacy 
 
Legal practice is affected by many factors beyond legislation itself. Most of these cannot be 
dealt with directly–the action must rather target the social environment. But there is one 
special aspect of this environment that plays a particularly important role in shaping legal 
practice, and that is the institutional and cultural framwork of legal advocacy. It is this 
framework that the second group of my policy proposals suggests to attack. 
 
• The Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights must have legal powers to conduct 
unobstructed inquiries in hospitals and clinics. According to the present regulation, he 
cannot have access to the files of a patient unless the latter filed a complaint with him 
or her.  
• The system of patients’ rights representatives needs to be revised. The law must 
provide for each medical institution having its own patients’ rights representative, and 
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each representative serving one and only one institution. It must be made a legal 
requirement that the patients’ rights representative should have contact hours on a 
daily basis. 
• Patients’ rights representatives should be required to make a report on their 
experiences year by year. Individual reports should be united into a general yearly 
report by the public trust responsible for the co-ordination of the activities of patients’ 
rights representatives. This report should focus on the systemic problems in the 
domain of patients’ rights. It should be tabled with the Parliament for discussion and 
endorsement, and it should be made accessible for the wider public. 
• Information on patients’ rights must be made widely accessible. Hospitals and clinics 
must be held accountable for their readiness to make available written materials 
explaining their patients what rights they possess and what remedies they have in case 
those rights are violated.  
• Procedural means must be established to enable the patient to name a surrogate 
decision-maker.  
• With regard to the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, beyond legal simplification 
mentioned in the above subsection, it is necessary to make sure that the physicians’ 
panels foreseen by the law to attest the validity of the patient’s decision are set up in 
all the relevant medical institutions. 
• A consultative body on bioethics should be set up to help the government to act, where 
this is necessary, to promote and to regulate the application of the new results of 
bioscience. This body would make statements on innovations in this field. Its positions 
taken on the welfare-related and ethical aspects of these innovations could stimulate 
public discussion. It is important for it to have members who are not scientists or 
physicians but represent the considered views of the general public. 
• In Hungary as elsewhere, patients organizations are created with the aim to facilitate 
self-help for a group of patients with a particular illness or disability and to lobby for 
the interests of that group with the Parliament and the relevant governmental 
authorities. As the reform of the health care system cannot be delayed anymore, the 
need in a robust presence of such organizations will be acutely felt. It is highly 
important that they receive public funding and other support so that they can step up 
their activities.  
• It is of a special importance that patients’ rights organizations can flourish. This, 
again, requires availability of public funding and readiness, on the part of the 
legislature and the executive, to engage in an ongoing dialogue with civil associations. 
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